Abstract : Corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade. This paper estimates the reduction using a structural model of import demand in which insecurity acts as a hidden tax. We find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do. We also find that omitting indexes of institutional quality biases other parameter estimates, obscuring a negative relationship between per capita income and the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods. Finally, we argue that cross-country variation in the effectiveness of institutions and consequent variation in traded goods prices offer a simple explanation of the observed global pattern of trade, in which high-income, capital-abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other.
Recent work re-emphasizes an old puzzle: distance and border effects account for far too much of the variation in trade volume across country pairs (Frankel, Stein and Wei 1998; Helliwell 1998; McCallum 1995) . Distance is more important than can plausibly be explained by transportation costs (Grossman 1998 ; but also see Hummels 1999) . Borders matter more than can be explained by tariffs, quotas, and formal impediments to trade. Hidden transactions costs may explain these results. This paper examines insecurity as one possible source of hidden costs.
Anecdotal evidence of the importance of insecurity abounds. A survey undertaken by the World Bank between August 1996 and January 1997 summarizes such stories well. Table 1 shows the ranking in order of importance of "the obstacles for doing business," based on responses by 3685 firms located in 69 countries. It is not surprising that firms should complain about taxes; it is remarkable, however, that corruption should rank as the second most important obstacle to business worldwide, with crime and theft not far behind. Complaints about trade regulations, currency and price controls, and labor and environmental regulations appear relatively insignificant. This paper fits a structural model of insecure trade to import data from 1996. Our results show not only that insecurity matters, but how much it matters and to whom it matters. The structural model also offers some insight into why insecurity matters.
We model two types of insecurity, one arising from predation, the other arising from imperfect contract enforcement. Each is shown to imply a price markup analogous to a hidden tax on trade. Predation itself can take either of two forms. When predation takes the form of theft, the price markup is determined by the probability that a particular shipment will be hijacked. When predation takes the form of the extortion of bribes by corrupt officials, the markup is equal to the proportion of the value of each shipment which shippers expect to lose. These markups are equivalent when risks can Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 2 be diversified through insurance or though making a large number of small shipments subject to independent risks. Imperfect contract enforcement leads to a slightly different markup. When entry into the international market involves sunk costs, imperfect contract enforcement exposes shippers to the holdup problem even when the investment is not partner-specific. In this case, the exogenous probability of enforcement determines the size of the price markup. These price markups, in turn, translate into reduced demand for imported goods. Source: Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 1997, p. 70. Fitting the structural model to the data, making use of data on institutional quality compiled by the World Economic Forum, we show that trade expands dramatically when it is supported by strong institutionsspecifically, by a legal system capable of enforcing commercial contracts and by transparent and impartial formulation and implementation of government economic policy. We estimate, for example, that if the indexes of institutional quality associated with the Latin American countries in our This paper begins by modeling the translation of insecurity into a price markup. The second section ties the price markup into import demand. The third section describes the data which are used to estimate the model in the fourth section. The fifth section reports several checks on the robustness of our results.
Modeling the Security of Trade
Two types of insecurity can generate price markups equivalent to a hidden tax on international trade. A model of "predation" views shipments as subject to attack by hijackers or corrupt officials. A model of "contractual insecurity" captures the impact of the holdup problem on shippers when fixed costs are associated with entry into the international market and contract enforcement is random. These are complementary rather than competing models. Each leads to a simple price markup which is a reduced form function of exogenous variables. Together they motivate the demand system estimated later in this paper.
Predation
Anderson and Marcouiller (1998) present a complete general equilibrium model of predation, in which utility-maximizing agents rationally allocate their labor across productive and predatory activities, endogenously determining the probability of successful shipment. Here we present a slightly simplified version of the model.
Thieves -or corrupt officials -attack shipments. Any shipment which is defended by less than the customary measures is identifiable as easy prey, attacked with certainty, and completely lost. Under these circumstances, all shippers will take the normal defensive measures and thieves will attack randomly. The probability that a normally defended shipment from country i will successfully evade capture is given by the asymmetric contest success function: Trade, Insecurity, and Home Bias p. 5 (1.1) In this paper we treat defensive arrangements L i D as given. 2 We also assume the world's total supply of bandit labor to be exogenously set:
∑ . The endogenous allocation of bandits across countries then
Bandits freely allocate themselves across countries in a competitive equilibrium so as to maximize expected loot 
A bit of algebra produces the reduced form solution for π i :
where w i is country i's share of total world trade.
denote the strength of a country's institutions for the defense of trade. Then:
If the probability of successfully crossing into country j is independent of the probability of successfully leaving i, the proportion of all shipments from producers in j which successfully reach their consumers in i is given by:
The probability of loss on this trade route, 1 −π ij ( ), determines the transactions cost and the corresponding price markup associated with insecurity.
Equation 1.5 can be extended to include other influences on π ij . When the two countries share a common border (represented by a dummy b ij ) or a common language (dummy l ij ), π i and π j may not be independent. The risk of theft might rise as the distance traveled rises, perhaps due to loss of information about ways to avoid hazards. 3 Adding these variables and changing to the considerably simpler relative security form π ij / π kj (the probability of successful shipment between i and j relative to the probability of successful shipment between k and j) produces the equation:
The price markup on imports by country i from country j relative to the markup on imports by k from j will reflect this relative probability of successful shipment, as described in Section 2 below.
Contractual Insecurity
Insecurity in the form of imperfect contract enforcement generates a price markup when fixed costs are associated with entry into the international market. Following Anderson and Young (1999) , we model a market in which for institutional reasons there is some exogenous probability 1 −θ ( ) that a given contract may fail to be enforced. When contracts are not enforced, the contracting parties engage in ex post bargaining, in which the sunk costs of trade (all handling charges up to the point of sale) are ignored. Foreseeing this possibility, high cost traders are discouraged from entering the market. The effect on trade can be modeled as a price markup equivalent to a tariff. The sketch of the model we present here is necessarily cursory, serving only to
give the elements which yield a plausible reduced form which we take to our empirical work. See Anderson and Young (1999) for details.
Sunk costs are associated with entry into international trade.
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International exchange occurs either according to the terms of a contract negotiated prior to incurring the sunk costs or in a non-contracted market into which those whose contracts are not enforced necessarily fall. We allow traders without enforced contracts to match only once per trading period. 5 In the non-contracted market, exchange occurs at the bargained price
where b and c are the exogenously determined outside options (home prices)
for the buyer and seller and ω ∈(0,1) is the bargaining strength of the seller.
In these circumstances, it is only by accident that the numbers of buyers and sellers would be equal. Any unmatched trader will return home to 4 In the usual holdup model, these costs are relationship-specific: the exporter designs a product for a particular importer. The outside option of the exporter is whatever resale value this design has for others. Similarly the outside option of the importer is whatever price must be paid for an equivalent design elsewhere. Here, we need not assume that the sunk costs are relationship specific because we assume that search is so expensive that traders match only once. 5 If rematching were possible, the trader who is faced with returning home to his outside option could offer a better deal than the bargained price to someone about to accept the bargain. That is, the outside option would be endogenous.
exchange at his outside option price. We focus in this development on the excess demand case, in which some potential importers are unable to find exporters with whom to strike a deal.
The actual volume exchanged is that on the short side of the market, read off the supply curve, s[p s (p * ,θ,b)], where p s is the equilibrium value of the certainty equivalent price to suppliers, which can be shown to be a reduced form function of the bargained price, the probability of enforcement and the outside option of the buyers. To obtain the "tariff equivalent" of the imperfect enforcement we first define the hypothetical buyers' price which would clear the market at the actual trade volume:
Then the ad valorem tariff equivalent is
The ad valorem tariff equivalent is decreasing in θ (see Anderson and Young, 1999) , hence better enforcement increases trade.
In our application, the assumed exogenous θ varies across countries so that country j's exports face different markups in each country i. The p* and b arguments of T ⋅ ( ) are handled as follows. The bargained price p* is a weighted average of the sellers' and buyers' reservation prices. The seller's reservation price is set at unity by convention and is invariant across buyers.
The buyers' reservation price b is modeled as a reduced form function of exogenous endowment variables. Finally, the weights in the bargained price are assumed to be equal for all country pairs, because in the absence of a bargaining theory which can discriminate among countries, it seems best to assume that 1-ω is the same across buyers. Under these assumptions, the security data we use as proxies for θ accurately pick up the effect of differing security arrangements on price markups.
Import Demand in an Insecure World
The strength of a nation's institutions affects the prices it must pay for traded goods, as shown in the previous section. Import demand depends in turn on these prices and on the division of expenditure between traded and nontraded goods.
We assume two-stage budgeting. Agents first determine the proportion of total expenditure to allocate to traded goods. In a second stage they allocate traded goods expenditure across individual imports, which are differentiated by place of origin. 6 The first-stage preferences are not restricted. Preferences across traded goods are CES and identical across countries. Production is specialized so that each country produces a nontraded good and a unique traded good.
Under these assumptions, the impact of prices on the demand in country i for imports from country j is given by:
where x i is country i's total expenditure on traded goods, p ij is the price of j's good in i with producer prices p jj normalized to one,
is the CES price index for traded goods in i, σ is the elasticity of substitution among traded goods, and α j is that parametric expenditure share on j's product which is common to all importers.
The country's total expenditure on traded goods, x i , is some fraction φ of the country's total income. The traded goods expenditure share (φ) is modeled as a reduced form function of the country's income, population and traded goods price index. A variety of static structural models yield such a function. 7 Anderson (1979) rationalized this reduced form with a model of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Bergstrand (1985 Bergstrand ( , 1989 developed the reduced form from a model with monopolistic competition and economies of scale. The equilibrium price of the nontraded good is a reduced form function in the same variables and is subsumed in the traded goods expenditure share function. Income and population pick up the effect of factor endowments, possible nonhomothetic preferences, and possible scale economies, while the traded goods price index picks up substitution between traded and nontraded goods. Substituting into 2.1:
where n i is population and y i is national income.
Insecurity enters the model through its effect on prices. The price of j 's product in i will exceed the producer's price for three reasons: a tariff if applicable, a transport cost dependent on distance, and an "insurance" markup which captures both the proportion of shipments lost to predators .5 is used in non-ratio form -call for the use of exporter-specific variables which cannot be identified simultaneously with an exporter-specific intercept.
Focusing on imports by i and k from the same exporter j eliminates this problem.
Imposing loglinearity on the price markup and focusing on relative prices gives us:
In Equation 2.3, a ij is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the two countries are associated in a free trade agreement, and t i is the importer's average ad valorem tariff. The unknown elasticity of the price with respect to distance and security is represented by the δ coefficients. The tariff term lacks a δ because an ad valorem tariff raises the price by precisely the amount of the tariff. Through its effect on relative prices, a rise in the contract model's relative probability of enforcement, β i /β k , would have an effect similar to that of a rise in the predation model's relative defensive capacity, S i / S k .
Using Equation 2.3 and imposing log-linearity on the traded goods
where P i / P k is the relative overall importer-specific traded goods price index.
Our third simplification is to approximate the relative traded goods price index by a version of the Törnqvist index:
where w j is the average across importers of the share of j's product in import expenditures. Most previous work with gravity models has ignored the price index term, which certainly results in misspecification. Our approximation is an imperfect but sensible and operational measure.
All the major elements of our model are now in place. We have modeled a world in which traded goods are differentiated by place of origin.
Differences across importers in demand for a single good have two sources:
(a) differences in the price markups associated with insecurity, distance, and tariffs, and (b) differences in the division of expenditure between traded and nontraded goods.
Data
The security of transactions depends upon the institutions which structure interaction among private firms and between private firms and the 1997, p.85) . Participants in the WEF survey were asked to assign a score ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) to each of the following statements:
• Government economic policies are impartial and transparent (Q 2.07);
• The legal system in your country is effective in enforcing commercial contracts (Q 8.06).
We rescale the mean response for each country to run from zero to one and use the rescaled means as measures of institutional quality, understanding Question 2.07 to gauge primarily the quality of interaction of the private sector with the state and Question 8.06 to gauge institutional support for exchange within the private sector.
Admittedly, these are noisy signals of institutional strength.
Expectations differ across countries, so that what counts as "effective" enforcement or "impartial" policy in the Ukraine may differ from what would be similarly classified in Singapore. The respondents to the survey form a selected group -even if they were randomly selected within a country, they would still represent only those who had chosen not to relocate or to shut down. Moreover, the Forum provides only the mean response for each country; we lack information about within-country variation in responses.
As a check on the robustness of our results, we also use a complementary "composite security" index formed by extracting the first principal factor from answers to the following questions:
• Government economic policies are impartial and transparent (2.07);
• Government regulations are precise and fully enforced (2.08);
• Tax evasion is minimal (2.11);
• Irregular additional payments are not common in business and official • The legal system is effective in enforcing contracts (8.06);
• Agreements and contracts with the government are not often modified due to budget cutbacks, changes in government or changes in government priorities (8.07);
• Private businesses can readily file lawsuits at independent and impartial courts if there is a breach of trust on the part of the government (8.08);
• New governments in your country honor the commitments and obligations of previous regimes (8.09);
• Citizens of your country are willing to adjudicate disputes rather than depending on physical force or illegal means (8.10);
• Your country's police are effective in safeguarding personal security so that this is not an important consideration in business activity (8.15);
• Organized crime does not impose significant costs on business in your country (8.16).
Uniformly positive factor loadings of roughly similar magnitude give us confidence that these questions, as a group, reliably identify an underlying "composite security" factor, although this factor is less precisely defined than our two preferred indicators. these data are far more complete than the data on import duties as a percentage of import expenditures reported in the WDI. 8 We composed dummy variables to capture sharing a common border, a common language, or common membership in ASEAN, the EU, Mercosur, or NAFTA. We have complete data on these variables for a total of 2182 import flows distributed across 48 importing countries. For an additional 24 bilateral 8 Even so, not every country has data available for 1996. We have used 1996 data where available, but in other years have used tariff data from 1997, 1995, or 1994 . While pairspecific bilateral tariffs would be preferred, compiling the more than 2000 tariffs which would be required surpasses our ability at this time.
pairs, no imports were reported. 9 Table 2 shows the importing countries in our data set and the number of positive import flows which we observe for each.
Estimation and Results
The analytical model leads to a simple result -relative import demand is a function of relative income, population, distance, tariffs, and variables associated with institutional quality. Estimation of the model in log-linear form supports three contentions:
• By lowering transactions costs, institutional support for secure exchange significantly raises international trade volume;
• Excluding institutional variables obscures a negative relation between income per capita and the share of income spent on traded goods;
• The institutional differences which we model can generate "a disproportionately high volume of trade among high-income countries," a pattern "which happens to accord well with trade patterns in the real world" (Deardorff 1998, p.16 ).
Equations 2.4 and 2.5 give us the following equation in terms of the underlying parameters of the theoretical model:
9 Actually, in these cases the country pair appears in the DOTS data matrix but the trade volume is given as "." Apparently this represents trade volume less than one significant digit of the units used for reporting (see notes to the yearbook). We interpret these as reports of zero trade. There are a few other cases in which the country pair simply does not appear in the DOTS data. We treat these as missing observations.
(4.1)
Equation 4.1 includes two dimensions of institutional quality, under the assumption that the "defensive capacity" variable of the predation model, S i , is determined by the interaction of institutions protecting commercial contracts and institutions ensuring public impartiality:
The indicators of institutional quality do not vary across exporters for a single importer; the "weighted average" institutional terms in the traded goods price index collapse into the unweighted terms. Therefore, the coefficient on each institutional index includes its effect on the price of j's good in i, δ 2 ρ, the direct effect of this price on imports of this good, −σ , and the indirect effect of this price on the traded goods expenditure share through the traded goods price index, (σ −1 + γ 3 ). Similarly, the "weighted average" tariff markup is nearly identical to the unweighted tariff markup, since few of the two thousand observations involve free trade, and these two terms have also been collapsed into a single term.
The weights of the Tornqvist index, w j , represent the ratio of expenditure on traded good j to total expenditure on all traded goods including the traded good produced at home. It can be shown that: We use this to construct a set of weights w j which sum to one and which are constant across consumers for a given producer.
Interpretation is eased by estimating the model in terms of GDP and GDP per capita rather than GDP and population. This final adaptation leaves us with the following equation as the foundation for empirical analysis:
The error includes two elements. The first captures any disturbance which systematically affects all of country i's imports relative to those of the base country k , υ ik , recognizing the panel character of our data. The second element is specific to imports by i from j relative to imports by k from j, ε ikj .
The base country k is held constant. In most cases, we estimate the regression by OLS using Stata's White correction for possible heteroscedasticity with clustering by importer. data are shown in the Appendix. We also estimate a tobit model in which the twenty-four unreported import flows are taken to be zero. 11 The fifth column presents the tobit results.
12
Our first point is shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 4 : the institutional quality variables have positive and significant coefficients. A few examples shed light on the magnitude of the effects implied by the point estimates of the parameters.
The enforceability of commercial contracts is rated roughly 10% higher in Belgium than in Brazil. Interpreting the estimated coefficient on enforceability as a reduced form elasticity, this difference implies roughly 4%
higher imports into Belgium than into Brazil, other things equal.
The mean enforceability rating among the twelve countries at the low end of the distribution is 0.52 (relative, as always, to the rating of the USA).
The mean enforceability rating among the twelve countries in the highest quartile of the distribution is 1.08. A country which saw the measure of the enforceability of its commercial contracts rise from 0.52 to 1.08 would see its import volume rise by 33%, other things equal.
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10 To avoid problems with the logs of negative numbers, we first form the ratio of country i 's score on each survey question to country k's score, then take the logs of the ratios, then find the first principal factor of the logs and score that variable. 11 With an elasticity of substitution among traded goods which exceeds one, high transactions costs can eliminate trade in some bilateral pairings. 12 In this case, the log of the import ratio, ln(0), was assigned a value 0.1 below the log of the lowest positive import ratio in the data set. Robust standard error with clustering by importer given in parentheses. Imports are cif, as reported by DOTS. For results using interpolated fob figures, see Appendix.
The elasticity of import demand with respect to the transparency and impartiality of economic policy is even higher, as well as estimated more precisely. Other things equal, imports into France should be on average about 5.3% higher than imports into Argentina simply because the transparency rating is about 10% higher in France than in Argentina. As can be seen from Equation 4.1, these "thought experiments"
involve several distinct effects, even when all other independent variables are assumed to be held equal. The calculations take into account the direct effect of insecurity on the "insurance" markup and the substitution effects associated with the change in price, effects which play out not only in substitution among traded goods but also in substitution between traded and nontraded goods. The latter effect requires the explicit inclusion in the regression of the traded goods price index, and our Tornqvist approach includes that index in a simple, easily operationalized way. The coefficients on the Tornqvist terms (the weighted ratios) have plausible signs, implying, with reference to Equation 4.1, that γ 3 < 1 and σ + γ 3 > 1. The coefficient on the weighted distance term is highly significant. Others have found a "remoteness" indicator to be empirically important in gravity models; our model offers theoretical rationalization for the importance. Finally, our model of the impact of the price index on imports implies that ˆ β 3 /ˆ β 9 , ˆ β 6 /ˆ β 10 , and ˆ β 7 /ˆ β 11 should all be equal. An F-test on the estimated coefficients does 14 Using the estimated coefficients, the projected rise in the log of the import ratio as the institutional ratings rise to EU levels is .530*(ln(1.19)-ln(.98))+ .385*(ln(.98)-ln(.62)), which equals 0.28. The rise in the average import ratio itself would be exp[0.28]-1. 15 The percentage increase in the average trade ratio expected when dropping the LA tariff ratio from 1.065 to 1 is given by exp [-4 .75*ln(1.065)]-1. 16 The 0.28 rise in log relative imports (footnore 15) is equivalent to, using the GDP and GDP per capita coefficients, (.860-.206)*ln(1.54), indicative of a 54% increase in relative GDP.
not reject that hypothesis.
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These results signal an important impact of institutional quality on trade volume. In fact, in the contemporary world poor institutions appear to constrain trade as much as tariffs do. The estimates justify our first and most important conclusion: by lowering transactions costs, institutional support for secure exchange significantly raises international trade volume.
Our second major finding is that higher income per capita reduces the share of expenditure devoted to traded goods, all else equal. This result, which stands in contrast to earlier results in the gravity literature, is consistent with anecdotal evidence that as income per capita rises, so does the share of expenditure devoted to nontraded services. Previous work with the gravity model usually found an overall income elasticity close to one; so do we, when tariffs and institutions are ignored, as in the first column of Table 4 (.837+.141=.978). However, when all the variables which our theoretical model requires are included, as in the third and fourth columns of Table 4 , we find an overall income elasticity less than 0.7 (.860-.206=.654; .866-.191=.675). Omission by the earlier literature of variables correlated with income per capita biased upward the estimated income effect.
Comparison across the columns of Table 4 This interpretation of the income parameters is dictated by our model.
Import demand is (Equation 2.2):
where traded goods expenditure is:
β 1 is the coefficient on income in Equation 4.2, and β 2 is the coefficient on income per capita. Therefore, −γ 2 =β 2 is the reduced form elasticity of the traded goods expenditure share with respect to income per capita, holding total income constant. Similarly, γ 1 +γ 2 =β 1 −1 is the reduced form elasticity of the traded goods expenditure share with respect to country size, as measured by GDP, holding GDP per capita constant. Omission of the institutional regressors does not dramatically bias the estimate of the size effect. Regardless of the model chosen, holding GDP per capita and all else constant, a 10% rise in GDP leads to about an 8.5% rise in traded goods expenditure, equivalent to a 1.5% drop in the traded goods expenditure share.
On the other hand, including the previously omitted variables leads to a dramatic shift in the estimated impact of income per capita. We estimate that a 10% rise in income per capita would lead to a 2% decline in the traded goods expenditure share.
Our home bias result ---other things equal, doubling per capita income F(2,47)=1.08. 18 This correlation is given in the data, but it does not imply that income per capita and institutional quality are necessarily linked, nor does it invalidate the "thought experiment"
reduces the traded goods expenditure share by 20% ---implies a very significant departure from homotheticity. This stands in contrast to the most recent applied trade literature (Davis and Weinstein, 1998; Davis, Weinstein, Bradford and Shimpo, 1997) . We coincide with Trefler (1995) in identifying the importance of home bias but diverge from him in tying home bias to income per capita; Trefler uses income per capita as an indicator of factoraugmenting technological differences across countries. Our aggregate results using the reduced form trade expenditure share bear some resemblance to earlier disaggregated work by Hunter and Markusen (1988) .
Of course, our model recognizes that the negative effect of income per capita on the trade expenditure share could be offset to some extent by an indirect price effect, since the better institutions and lower tariffs of the highincome countries lower the traded goods price index. Combined income and price effects explain why the data show a small positive correlation (.13) between per capita GDP and total imports divided by GDP.
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Our third main contention is that institutional differences can generate "a disproportionately high volume of trade among high-income countries," a pattern "which happens to accord well with trade patterns in the real world" (Deardorff 1998, p.16 ). Why should high-income countries skew their trade toward imports from other high-income countries -in spite of the presumed similarity of factor endowment? And what answer to the first question can be consistent with the stylized fact that low-income countries do not rely disproportionately on imports from other low-income countries?
Several solutions to the puzzle have been proposed (notably Markusen 1986). We offer an explanation based on the price markup associated with insecure trade. Effective institutions in the importing country lower transactions costs, lower the prices of traded goods, and raise imports, holding reported above in which institutions were improved without a corresponding increase in income per capita. 19 The ratio of imports to GDP is not an exact measure of the traded goods expenditure share. It excludes expenditure on the domestically produced tradable good and includes expenditure on goods which are re-exported. countries. This solves a problem alluded to in Deardorff's (1998, p.16) informal exposition of an explanation based on identical but non-homothetic preferences. Our story implies disproportionate trade among consumers of the "high-income" good, but it does not imply counterfactually a similarly disproportionate amount of trade among low-income consumers.
Robustness
In this section we briefly examine four questions: How do the estimated parameters differ when lagged GDP is used as an instrument for current GDP? How do they differ when the base country is changed? How would they appear if we estimated a model of levels of imports rather than import ratios? Can more general functional forms be estimated?
A more complex model than ours might treat GDP as an endogenous variable. If a single shock can simultaneously shift both GDP and imports, then correlation between the GDP regressor and the error term of the import regression could bias our parameter estimates. With this in mind, we Robust standard error in parentheses, with clustering by importer.
The results, which exclude German trade due to a data problem, 21 are presented in Table 5 . The first column is our usual specification, the second 20 More precisely, using data from World Development Indicators, we multiplied the figure for 1995 GDP in current local currency units by the ratio of the country's 1996 GDP deflator to its 1995 GDP deflator and converted that result to 1996 dollars using the official exchange rate. 21 World Development Indicators does not include German GDP deflators.
uses lagged GDP. The new parameter estimates are well within one standard error of the old and strengthen, if anything, the security and home bias effects.
In theory, there is no reason to suspect that the change of the base country k would make any difference to the parameter estimates. In fact, we run into two problems. We have no data on home consumption of the exported good. Therefore, for any base country k , we lack a measure of m kk .
Since we have no denominator for the relative import measure m ik /m kk , we can never include any country's imports from the base country in the sample used in estimation. Results could be sensitive to the exclusion of differing sets of 47 import observations. A second problem is tied to measurement error. Many of our independent variables take the form ln(x i /x k ) . The measurement error associated with x k depends on the choice of k , so the parameter estimates may vary with the choice of the base country.
22 Table 6 Robust standard errors with clustering by importer in parentheses. 
where β j is a vector of 48 exporter dummies.
As Table 8 shows, the results of estimating this "levels" model, apart from the jump in R-squared attributable to the exporter-specific intercepts, are similar to those already presented. The security variables are still estimated to have a positive effect. The point estimates of the coefficients on the institutional variables are similar, and the significance levels are only slightly less. Moreover, the coefficient on the income per capita variable behaves as already described -moving from very significantly positive to marginally significantly negative as the tariff and security variables are added to the model.
Finally, we experimented with more general functional forms. We tried a translog specification of defensive capacity instead of using
. A Wald test could not reject the hypotheses that the coefficients on all the second order terms were jointly zero, so we returned to the log-linear specification. We also tried to estimate a translog as an approximation to the trade share function
but found that we could not identify all the necessary parameters with information on 47 countries. Robust standard error with clustering by importer given in parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 repeat results given in Table 4 , above.
Summary and Conclusion
Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that transactions costs associated with insecure exchange significantly impede international trade. Predation by thieves or by corrupt officials generates a price markup equivalent to a hidden tax or tariff. Insecure enforcement of contracts can have the same effect.
These price markups significantly constrain international trade where legal systems poorly enforce commercial contracts and where economic policy lacks transparency and impartiality.
This paper builds a structural model of import demand in an insecure world and estimates the model using data collected by the World Economic Forum. We find that a 10% rise in a country's index of transparency and impartiality leads to a 5% increase in its import volumes, other things equal.
Significant costs are associated with institutional weakness. They beg for serious consideration as we try to solve "the mystery of the missing trade" (Trefler, 1995) .
We find that the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods declines as income per capita rises, other things equal. This result stands in sharp contrast to the frequent practice of using homothetic preferences in trade models and to recent findings that homothetic preferences cannot be rejected by statistical tests. The latter finding is replicated here when tariffs and the institutional variables are excluded. Based on this, we claim that omitted variable bias accounts for others' failure to reject homotheticity. The home bias effect of higher income tends to be counterbalanced by a decline in the price index of traded goods as income per capita rises, so that there is in the end a small positive correlation between income per capita and import expenditure as a share of GDP.
Finally, the paper suggests an explanation for the stylized fact that highincome, capital-abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other.
These countries are also, in our data, the countries with strong institutions for the defense of exchange. Since the traded goods price markup depends on the degree of insecurity in both the exporting and the importing countries, trade among the rich countries will be relatively unhampered by securityrelated transactions costs, while trade among poor countries will be doubly disadvantaged.
A OLS: Robust standard error with clustering by importer given in parentheses.
